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FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE HOME MORTGAGE
LENDING MARKET ENHANCED BY THE "FRAUD
ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT OF 2009"
Nicholas McCann*
I. Introduction

T

he rise of the subprime lending market in the early 2000's
allowed many Americans who may have otherwise been
denied credit to realize the dream of homeownership.' However,
with the benefits of the subprime lending market came more
opportunities for improper and fraudulent lending practices. The
subprime lending market was particularly susceptible to fraud
due to innovative adjustable rate mortgages, a wider variety of
pricing options, and new methods of selling these loan products to
consumers. During the peak of the subprime mortgage market,
half of all subprime mortgages were originated by private
mortgage lending businesses that were not regulated by the
federal government Mortgage fraud perpetrated by these
unregulated private mortgage brokers may have contributed to
the instability and loss in the residential lending market that
contributed to the mortgage crisis.
In response to the sharp increase of reported fraud in the
mortgage industry, on May 20, 2009, President Obama signed the
bipartisan "Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009"
("FERA") into law.3 FERA enhanced several federal statutes
J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
I Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution
of the Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 31,
31 (2006) (Potential borrowers in the subprime market may fail credit history
requirements in the prime mortgage market, and therefore have greater access
to credit in the subprime market).
2 Greg Ip & Damian Paletta, Lending Oversight:Regulators Scrutinized in
Mortgage Meltdown -States, Federal Agencies Clashed on Subprimes As
Market Ballooned, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2007, at Al (Federal regulators had
no enforcement authority over state-licensed, stand alone private mortgage
lenders).
' Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123
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pertaining to financial fraud, particularly those that are
applicable to mortgage fraud prosecutions.4 The clear purpose of
the provisions of FERA applicable to mortgage fraud
prosecutions was to substantially strengthen the federal
government's ability to investigate and prosecute mortgage
fraud.5 Additionally, policy makers sought to provide more
"accountability for the corporate and mortgage frauds that
contributed to the recent economic collapse."6 FERA enhances
the federal government's ability to investigate and prosecute
mortgage fraud in two ways: (1) FERA amended key federal
statutes to include private mortgage lending businesses and
mortgage brokers within the definition of a "financial institution,"
allowing the application of federal fraud statutes and enhanced
punishment provisions to private mortgage brokers; and (2)
FERA substantially increases resources to federal investigative
and prosecutorial agencies to disrupt and prosecute mortgage
fraud.7
Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) ("[a]n
Act to improve enforcement of mortgage fraud, securities and commodities
fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds related to Federal
assistance and relief programs, for the recovery of funds lost to these frauds,
and for other purposes").
I FERA modified several important financial fraud statutes that will not
be analyzed in this note, including the "False Claims Act" 31 U.S.C.A §§ 3729 3733 (2006) amended by Pub. L. No. 111-21, §4a-c, 123 Stat. 1621-25 (2009),
and the federal Major Frauds against the United States statute 18 U.S.C. §
1031 (2006) amended by Pub. L. No. 111-2 1, §2d 123 Stat. 1618 (2009), which
now includes the Troubled Asset Relief Program funds in order to protect
Government assistance from fraud that was provided during the economic
crisis.
' Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, Remarks by
the President at the Signing of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act
and the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (May 20, 2009) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-atSigning-of-the-Helping-Families-Save-Their-Homes-Act-and-the-FraudEnforcement-and-Recovery-Act/ (President Obama stating that FERA
"provides the resources necessary for [. .] law enforcement and federal
agencies, from the Department of Justice to the SEC to the Secret Service, to
pursue these criminals, bring them to justice, and protect hardworking
Americans affected most by these crimes").
6 S. REP. No. 111-10, at 2 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430; see
also 155 CONG. REC. S4531-01 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Kaufman) (" [... ] this bill is a critical step to restoring investor confidence in

the financial markets by assuring the public that criminal behavior by
unscrupulous mortgage brokers and corrupt financiers will be prosecuted and
punished").
7 S. REP. No. 111-10, at 3.
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This note will discuss the purpose of FERA and predict
whether its statutory enhancements and allocation resources for
federal law enforcement will protect homeowners and the lending
industry from mortgage fraud perpetrated by private mortgage
brokers. Part II of this note will provide a context for federal law
enforcement against mortgage fraud. First, a brief history of the
rise and fall of the subprime mortgage market is necessary to
discuss the extent to which mortgage fraud perpetrated by
private mortgage lenders played a role in the mortgage crisis.
Next, mortgage fraud will be defined, and an overview of its
victims and case examples will be provided. Additionally, the
landscape of federal statutory law prior to the enactment of
FERA will be analyzed.
Part III this Note will discuss the Congressional intent
behind enacting FERA and how FERA fits within, and changes,
the landscape of federal law enforcement of mortgage fraud. Part
IV will analyze and predict the effectiveness of FERA in future
fraud enforcement, and address criticisms of FERA. Ultimately,
FERA necessarily updates federal statutory law to address fraud
in the modern real estate market. Additionally, FERA provides
the resources necessary to ensure that those laws are enforced for
the purpose of protecting home mortgage lenders, and ultimately
consumers.
II. Home Mortgage Lending and Mortgage Fraud
The subprime mortgage crisis arose from aggressive and
risky lending practices, and in part because homeowners took on
debt that they could not afford. The mortgage lending industry
has been hit hard by billions of dollars in losses as risky subprime
loans have increasingly gone into default, and analysts expect
hundreds of thousands more loans could go bad over the next
several years." Opportunities for improper practices in mortgage
lending were much more prevalent in the subprime market than
in the prime market, because the subprime market offers a wider
variety of loan products and strategies to craft pricing options
and risk mitigation.' The relative contributions to lender failures
that have been made by fraudulent activity, as opposed to risky
and misjudged mortgage products, are not known and may never
8 Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle'Trans Even Very CreditWorthy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at Al.
9
Joseph D. Adamson & Todd J. Zywicki, The Law and Economics of
Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 8 (2009).
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be clear.' ° However, there has been a significant increase in
suspected mortgage fraud and other mortgage-related criminal
activity in the home lending market.1 1
A. The Subprime Lending Market
Subprime loans are high interest loans that are offered to
people who typically do not qualify for market rate mortgages.
Potential borrowers, who are unable to meet the credit history
requirements for standard or prime mortgages, have greater
access to credit in the subprime market. 2 Traditionally the
mortgage market set minimum lending standards based on a
borrower's financial history. However, the subprime market
introduced a substantial amount of risk based pricing with
innovative loan products by varying the interest rates of a loan
based upon the borrower's credit history and down payment.13
Furthermore, upfront and continuing costs are higher for
subprime loans, including application fees, appraisal fees, and
other fees associated with originating a mortgage. 4 Low
documentation and stated income and option adjustable rate
mortgages offered to non-conforming borrowers were the key
"

Merle Sharick et al., Tenth PeriodicMortgage Fraud Case Report to the

Mortgage Brokers Association, 10 MORTGAGE ASSET RES. INST. 8 (2008)

available at http://www.marisolutions.com/pdfs/mbamortgage-fraud-report10th.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); Press Release, Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, Letter to the Editor Regarding the Mortgage Crisis, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel08/kaiserletter090208.htm (last visited Feb.
20, 2010) ("[F]raud alone does not appear to be the straw that broke the
mortgage camel's back" because most of the mortgage crisis can be attributed
to very aggressive lending practices and too little risk management in the
mortgage industry).
" Enforcement of FinancialConsumer ProtectionLaws, Before the Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 11 1th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Elizabeth A. Duke, Member,
Bd. of Governors
of the
Fed. Reserve
Sys.) available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcsdem/frb - duke.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20 2010) [hereinafter Enforcement of Financial Consumer
ProtectionLaws].
12 Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 1, at 31.
'3

Id. at 55.

14 Id. at

32 (federal deregulation of the mortgage industry opened the door
to the development of the subprime lending market); see Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 226 (2006)); Alternative Mortgage
Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act
of 1982, Pub L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §
3901-3806 (2006)).
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culprits in the current state of the meltdown. 5
Subprime loans were common in areas with large minority
populations or low to moderate income populations. However, in
the peak of the subprime boom, even borrowers with credit scores
high enough to qualify for conventional loans with better terms
were receiving subprime mortgages.16 In 1994 fewer than 5
percent of mortgage originations were subprime, but by 2005
about 20 percent of new mortgage loans were subprime.Y
Additionally, the growth of mortgage securitization was a
major factor in the explosion of the subprime mortgage market.
There have been more than $2.5 trillion in subprime loans made
since 2000, most of which were ultimately packaged into
securities for sale to investors. 8 In 1995, subprime mortgages
were securitized at a rate of 30%. 19 The percentage of subprime
loans that were securitized rose from to 50.4% in 2001 to 81.2% in
2005.20 The advent of securitization of subprime loans allowed an
increase in competition and a wider variety of mortgage products
available for consumers as more mortgage brokers and mortgage
finance companies entered the market and competed with
traditional banks.2 1 More private mortgage brokers were able to
enter the market and compete with traditional banks by offering
a wider variety of mortgage products available to consumers that
were being packaged into securities at an ever increasing rate.
B. Private Mortgage Brokers
The role of private mortgage brokers began to grow as
subprime lending moved from traditional lending banks.22
et. al., supra note 10, at 3.
Brooks & Simon, supra note 8, at Al.
17 Subprime Mortgages and PredatoryMortgage Lending: New Regulatory
Guidance, Current Market Conditions and Effects on Regulated Financial
Institutions Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit, Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Sandra F. Braunstein, Dir.,
Div. of Consumer and Cmty. Affairs, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys.) available at http://financial
services.house.gov/hearingl10/htbraunsteinO32707.pdf (last visited Feb. 20
2010) [hereinafter Hearing on Subprime Mortgages].
18 Brooks & Simon, supra note 8, at Al.
19 Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 1, at 37.
20 Adamson & Zywicki, supra note 9, at 8.
21 Hearingon Subprime Mortgages, supra note 17.
15 Sharick,

16

22 WILLIAM

APGAR & RENE S. ESSENE, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING

MARKET
MORTGAGE
UNDERSTANDING
UNIV.,
HARVARD
STUDIES,
BEHAVIOR: CREATING GOOD MORTGAGE OPTIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS 2
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Private mortgage brokers or independent finance companies,
which are non-depository institutions not subject to federal
regulation, began to be more involved in the lending market and
contributed to the explosion of subprime mortgages.23 By 2005
during the peak of the subprime mortgage market, 52% of
subprime mortgages were originated by companies that were not
regulated by the federal government.14 Bundling
and
selling
home loans in the secondary mortgage market provided private
mortgage brokers with great incentive to make numerous loans
with increased risk of default and foreclosure, because they
received fees for things such as loan origination and loan
application processing fees.2" Innovative loan products including
teaser-rate adjustable rate mortgages, low or zero-equity loans,
and subprime loans allowed mortgage brokers in the mortgage
industry to shift the risk of these loans to lenders and ultimately
consumers. 26 Since they were often bundled and sold to investors,
the poor quality of these loans could be concealed by the brokers
who originated the loans. 27
(2007) available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
finance/mm07-1_mortgagemarketbehavior.pdf (last visited Feb. 20 2010)
(The development of new mortgage products, such as innovative adjustable
rate mortgages, and new approaches to sell these products contributed to
private mortgage brokers acquiring a significant share of the residential
lending market) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET
BEHAVIOR].
23 Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "Hel" was Paved with
Good CongressionalIntentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home
Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 526 (2000); see also FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, MORTGAGE LOAN FRAUD: AN INDUSTRY
ASSESSMENT BASED UPON SUsPIcIOUs ACTIVITY REPORT ANALYSIS 6 (2006),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/newsroom/
rp/reports/pdf/MortgageLoanFraud.pdf
(last visited Feb.
20, 2010)
[hereinafter FINCEN SusPIcIous ACTIVITY REPORT ANALYSIS] (Noting that
in 2006, the National Association of Mortgage Brokers reports that as many as
two thirds of all mortgage loans are now originated by mortgage brokers).
24 Ip & Paletta, supra note 2 (stating that federal regulators had no
enforcement authority over state-licensed, stand alone private mortgage
lenders).
21 UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR, supra,note 22, at
51.
26 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE
PUBLIC FISCAL YEAR 2007 (2007), http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/
fcsreport2007/financialcrime_2007.htm
(last visited Feb.
20, 2010)
[hereinafter FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC FISCAL YEAR 2007].
27 Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the
Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1268 (2009) (explaining that
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Therefore, the shift in a substantial amount of loan
originations to third-party mortgage brokers driven by the
compensation structure of the lending market, created more
opportunities for fraud. As a result, private mortgage brokers
could take advantage of borrowers and investors alike by
engaging in fraudulent lending practices by misrepresenting the
terms of a loan to lenders, and ultimately passing the burden of a
risky loan product onto consumers.28
C. Mortgage Fraud
Mortgage fraud involves intentional misrepresentations to
a lender for the purpose of obtaining a loan that would otherwise
not have been made, if the lender had been given truthful
information. Mortgage fraud is defined by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation
("FBI")
as
"a
material
misstatement,
misrepresentation, or omissions, relied upon by an underwriter or
lender to fund, purchase, or insure a loan."29 Mortgage loan fraud
can be divided into two categories: (1) fraud for property, which
entails "misrepresentations by the applicant for the purpose of
purchasing property as a primary residence"; and (2) fraud for
profit, which often involves multiple loans and schemes
"perpetrated to gain illicit proceeds from property sales."30 Fraud
for profit will be the type of fraud analyzed in this note, as it is
the main target of federal law enforcement efforts.
Also, it is important to distinguish mortgage fraud from
"predatory lending" which forces borrowers to pay high
origination fees, subprime or high interest rates, unreasonable
servicing fees, and ultimately causes the borrower to default or

securitization could lead the degrading of the quality of underwriting that the
loan originators used in determining which borrowers to lend, and the terms
upon which the loan will be made).
28 Id. at 1268 (2009); see also UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET
BEHAVIOR, supra note 22, at 9 (explaining that private mortgage brokers may
not always be acting in the borrower's best interest due to the premiums they
would obtain by selling loans to wholesale lenders, and therefore have an
incentive to place borrowers with particular loan products that may or may
not reflect the borrowers best interests).
29 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2008 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT
"YEAR IN REVIEW" (2008), http://www.fbi.gov/Publications

/fraud/mortgage-fraud08.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) [hereinafter FBI 2008
MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT].
30

Id.
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undergo a foreclosure.3 1 Predatory loans include an inevitable
anticipated default and foreclosure on a home, and can give rise
to fraudulent lending practices." However, predatory lending
will not be analyzed by this note.
The federal government focuses on investigating fraud for
profit, which is more egregious than fraud for housing, and is
sometimes referred to as "industry insider fraud."3 3 Industry
insiders include: appraisers, accountants, attorneys, real estate
brokers, mortgage underwriters and loan processors, settlement
or title insurance employees, mortgage brokers, and loan
originators.34 Fraud perpetrated by industry insiders accounts for
80 percent of all reported fraud losses.35 Fraud for profit occurs
where the underlying motivator is cash, and typically involves
collusion of industry insiders who slip away with the cash,
leaving the buyer to deal with future mortgage risk.36
There were, and remain, several opportunities for fraud in
the home mortgage market. The use of the internet to receive and
process loan applications has increased, leading to streamlined
low document, or even "no-document" loans, and created a
condition vulnerable to fraud. Additionally, industry insiders
with vast knowledge of the origination process took advantage of
the system to defraud lenders by falsifying borrower

31 FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC FISCAL YEAR 2007, supra
note 26; see also Adamson & Zywicki, supra note 9, at 12 (While there is no
precise definition for predatory lending, a predatory loan is generally one
where there is no reasonable anticipated financial benefit to borrowers).
3 Adamson & Zywicki, supra note 9, at 12.
33 FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC FISCAL YEAR 2007, supra
note 26; see also The Need for Increased FraudEnforcement in the Wake of the
Economic Downturn Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(statement of John Pistole, Deputy Dir. Fed. Bureau of Investigation)
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=3651&witid=7603 [hereinafter Statement of John Pistole,
Deputy Dir. Fed. Bureau of Investigation] ("Industry insiders are of priority
concern as they are, in many instances, the facilitators that permit the fraud to
occur").

34FBI 2008 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT, supra note 29.
15

Id. at 14

36

CHOICE

POINT,

MORTGAGE

ASSET

RESEARCH

INST.,

CURBING

MORTGAGE FRAUD: PROACTIVE STRATEGIES, WHITE PAPER 4 (2008) (on file
with author) [hereinafter CURBING MORTGAGE FRAUD].
11 James H. Freis Jr., Dir., Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Remarks at
the Mortgage Bankers Association National Fraud Issues Conference (Mar. 16,
2009), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news-room/speech/html/2009
0316.html last visited Feb. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Remarks of James H. Freis].
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documentation, or even creating false loan applications.' In
many instances, fraud perpetrated by insiders was concealed by
the sheer volume of loan originations, and the profitable sales on
collateral.3 9
D. Victims of Mortgage Fraud in the Home Lending Market
While, mortgage fraud most proximately affects lenders
and investors, victims of mortgage fraud extend throughout the
home lending market. Victims of mortgage fraud can include
borrowers, mortgage industry entities, and those living in
neighborhoods affected by mortgage fraud.4 ° When lenders are
subject to fraudulent activity, the effects trickle down to
consumers doing business with victimized institutions, or
consumers seeking new loans. Therefore, consumers are finding
themselves exposed to mortgage fraud, as complaints and
problems are on the rise across the country.4
In addition to victimizing consumers and lenders,
mortgage fraud has contributed to the overall uneasiness in the
home mortgage market. Flaws in the lending system undercut
investor confidence. Until investors are satisfied with the system,
the market is likely to remain in a depressed state.4 Due to the
lack of investment in the residential mortgage market, there may
be requirements of higher returns for mortgage backed
securities. 43 Furthermore, the lack of investment may result in a
limited amount of investment funds available for mortgage loans.
Financial institutions and other lenders are victims of
mortgage fraud, because fraudulently obtained loans can cost
lenders in the home mortgage market millions of dollars.4 4 When
" CURBING MORTGAGE FRAUD,
39 Id.
40

supra note 36 at 4.

FBI 2008 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT, supra note 29.

41 UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR, supra note 2 2, at 2.
42 Gretchen Morgenson, Get Ready, Get Set, Point Fingers, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 13, 2008, at BU 1.
41 Mortgage Fraud and its Impact on Mortgage Lenders Before the
H.
Comm. on Housing and Comty. Opportunity, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement
of Chris Swecker, Assistant Dir. Criminal Investigation Div., Fed. Bureau of
Investigation)
available
at
http://financialserviceshousegov/medial
pdf/100704cs.pdf[hereinafter Mortgage Fraud and its Impact on Mortgage
Lenders].
44 Mortgage Fraud and its Impact on Mortgage Lenders Before the H.
Comm. on Housing and Comty. Opportunity, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement
of Bob Ney, Chairman, Subcomm. On Housing, and Cmty. Opportunity)
availableat http://financialservices.
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a fraud scheme is perpetrated against a mortgager lender, the
lender and investors must recoup their losses. 45 The losses are
then passed on to consumers in the form of increased interest
rates, higher mortgage prices, decreased availability of mortgage
credit, and decreased loan values. 46 Additionally, government
insured loans that fall victim to fraud will at the end of the day be
paid for by American taxpayers.
Homeowners can be victimized more directly by mortgage
fraud occurring in their community. The recent downturn in the
housing market and the rise in foreclosures have exacerbated the
instances of mortgage fraud. Consumer debt has grown due to a
rise in interest rates, and adjustable-rate mortgage payment
increases.48 Consumer debt combined with an increase in home
prices has led to an increase in foreclosure rescue scams.
Therefore, mortgage fraud can rob homeowners of their homes,
49
savings, and their security in their home equity.
Mortgage fraud often results in early defaults on loans,
which is likely contributing to higher numbers of delinquencies
and foreclosures. 0 Property values in neighborhoods affected by
mortgage fraud can experience a swing from being artificially
inflated to depreciating in value as properties go into foreclosure
due to fraudulently acquired loans. 1 Foreclosed properties can
remain vacant for long periods of time and contribute to
neighborhood instability and stigma. 52 Therefore, mortgage fraud
has a trickle down effect on the residential lending market. Fraud
perpetrated against lenders has broad effects on the residential
real estate market by impacting investment and the availability
house.gov/medialpdf/100704ne.pdf.
Impact on Mortgage Lenders]
45 MORTGAGE

[hereinafter

Mortgage Fraud and its

BANKERS ASS'N, MORTGAGE FRAUD: STRENGTHENING

FEDERAL AND STATE MORTGAGE FRAUD PREVENTION EFFORTS 5 (2007),

http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/News/internalResource/5 7274_Study.p
df (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) [hereinafter MORTGAGE FRAUD].
46 Id. at 5.
41 Mortgage Fraud and its Impact on Mortgage Lenders, supra note 44, at
1.
48 STEVE TRIPOLI & ELIZABETH RENAURT, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
DREAMS FORECLOSED: THE RAMPANT THEFT OF AMERICANS' HOMES
THROUGH EQUITY-STRIPPING FORECLOSURE "RESCUE" SCAMS 7 (2005),

available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/news/ForeclosureReportFinal.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
41 Remarks of James H. Freis, supra note 37.
so MORTGAGE FRAUD, supra note 45, at 5.
s1 FBI 2008 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT, supra note 29.
52 UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR, supra note 22, at 2.
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of credit for consumers. Additionally, mortgage fraud can be
committed directly on consumers through foreclosure rescue
scams.
E. Examples of Mortgage Fraud
The ultimate goals of the mortgage fraudsters may be
different, and will determine what type of frauds are perpetrated.
-For instance in some cases the goal of the fraudster may be to
realize only the net amount from his mortgage fraud scheme.53
Or, on the other hand, a fraudster may at the time the fraud is
committed have as their ultimate objective to realize the full
value of the sales price of a loan they had originated, which
involves selling the loan to another financial business. 4 Another
factor which influences the type of fraud scheme perpetrated is
the overall state of the economy and the residential lending
market. When times are good and loan originations are up, there
will likely be more fraud at the origination stage. However, there
is a consensus among industry experts that there is a direct
correlation between mortgage fraud and the distressed housing
markets. 5 When the lending market is distressed, then
foreclosure rescue scams and loan modification fraud will likely
increase.
The following three cases provide examples of common
fraudulent lending practices committed by private mortgage
brokers in the residential real estate market, and demonstrate the
harm such criminal conduct can have on lenders and
homeowners alike. The examples also illustrate the types of fraud
that can exist at different stages of the overall health of the
housing market.
The first example involves false and material
misrepresentations on loan applications; the most commonly
reported type of fraud.56 In United States v. Septon, the
5 See United States v. Carter, 412 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2005).
54 See United States v. Miller, 588 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2009).
51 FBI 2008 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT, supra note 29; see also FIRST
AMERICAN CORELOGIC, CORE MORTGAGE

RISK MONITOR Q2, 3 (2007),

available at https://www.corelogic.com/documents/CoreMortgage-RiskMonitorQ2_2007.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
56 Jennifer Butts et al., Eleventh Periodic Mortgage Fraud Case Report to
Mortgage Bankers Association, 11 MORTGAGE ASSET RESEARCH INST. 5
(2009), available at http://www.mbaa.org/files/Advocacy/2009/2009MARI
FraudCaseReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); FINCEN SusPicious
ACTIVITY REPORT ANALYSIS,

supra note 23, at 1.
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defendant engaged in a mortgage fraud scheme that allowed a
private mortgage broker to realize the profit of his illegal scheme
himself." Beginning in 2000 and continuing through 2004, a
mortgage broker who ran his own mortgage lending business
instructed his employees to submit fraudulent loan applications,
provide homebuyers with "bridge-loans" for down payments
allowing them to purchase their new homes, and to act as a sham
employer for homebuyers and borrowers in order to falsify and
substantiate their incomes.58 Between sixty-five and eighty
percent of the loans brokered were fraudulent.5 9 The broker
collected interest on the bridge-loans to homebuyers, and
obtained commissions and fees for brokering these fraudulent
loans which were ultimately approved by oblivious banks or
mortgage lending companies.6 ° Many of the home loans brokered
went into default, and caused losses to the lenders in excess of $2
million.6 '
In contrast, there are cases in which a private mortgage
broker committed fraud, where the broker sought more than to
simply profit directly off the fraudulently originated loans. The
intended objective of such fraud schemes is to realize the full face
value sales price of the amount of each loan that the broker
originated, by obtaining its profit after being sold to a bank or
lender. In United States v. Miller a private mortgage broker who
owned and operated a financial services business acting as a
correspondent lender had packaged and sold fraudulently
acquired individual residential mortgage loans to lending
institutions.
This case involved the largest mortgage broker in
Arkansas, and implicated its top ten executives.6 3 In Miller, the
broker would receive commissions from the individual
borrowers, as well as fees from the lenders who bought the
individual loans from Miller. 64 The broker and his co-

s United States v. Septon, 557 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2009) (The United States
charged the broker with conspiring to commit mail and bank fraud, and bank
fraud, and ultimately resulted in a guilty plea).
58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 936.

61

Id.

62

Miller, 588 F.3d at 562 (The broker was convicted for conspiracy to

commit wire fraud, and aiding and abetting wire fraud, and was sentenced to
one year and a day of imprisonment).
63 FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC FISCAL
YEAR 2007, supra
note 26.
4 Miller, 588 F.3d at 562
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conspirators at the business sent fraudulent loan documents to
several lending institutions, which contained misrepresentations
as to the appraisal worth of properties, the qualifications of
borrowers, the state of titles, and fee and service charges. 65 As a
result, the loans originated by this broker were much riskier than
were represented to the banks and lenders, and induced them to
purchase these risky loans.6 6 Testimony from these banks and
lenders at trial established that none of them would have bought
the mortgages if there had been truthful and complete
disclosure.67 The total amount of the fraudulent loans was
$3,770,784, and while the broker reaped the profit, the risk of
these loans was passed on to the lenders, and dealt with by the
homeowners.68
The most recent form of mortgage fraud are "foreclosure
rescue" scams, which typically consist of perpetrators soliciting
distressed homeowners in foreclosure and inducing them to sign
over title of the property or requiring upfront fees on the pretense
of rescuing their home.69 A particularly egregious case involved a
foreclosure rescue scam combined with an "equity skimming"
scam illustrating the impact that mortgage fraud can have on
lenders, homeowners, and communities.7 ° In 2008, two
indictments were issued and alleged that the defendant's
financial services business "Creative Loans, L.L.C." contacted
homeowners near foreclosure, and would either assure
homeowners they would be able to avoid foreclosure71 , or enter a
program that would allow them to refinance their home and
repair damaged credit. In this scam, the business would arrange
for "straw buyers 73 to replace financially distressed homeowners
65 Id.

Id. at 562-63
at 563.
68
Id. at 567.
66

67 Id.
69
70

See FBI 2008 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT, supra note 29.
See FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC FISCAL

YEAR 2007,

supra note 26 (equity skimming schemes involve the use of corporate shell
companies, corporate identity theft, and the use or threat of bankruptcy or
foreclosure to dupe homeowners or investors).
71 Indictment at 2, United States v. Charles Head et al.,- No. 08-cr-116
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2008), available at http://www.centralmediaserver.com/
KNXV/news/20080324110751780.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).

72 Indictment at 2, United States v. Charles Head et al., No. 08-r-116
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.centralmediaserver.com/
KNXV/news/20080324110710500.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
"3 Michael Barnhill & Brad R. Jacobson, Drawing the Short StrawMortgage Fraudand Straw Buyers, 21 UTAH BAR J. 9 (2008) (straw buyers are
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on

of their homes,

the titles

without

the homeowner's

knowledge.7 4

This was an "equity skimming" operation, where
once the title belonged to the "straw buyer", the business would
take out a loan on the home and extract all the equity left in that
home.75
The objective of this fraud scheme was to deceive
homeowners to gain control of the property, and deceive lenders
to provide loans on the property. The homeowners would
continue to pay rent to .the business, as the business profited on
the loan taken out on the home.7 6 Ultimately, the homeowners
were left without their home when the loans were foreclosed on,
the equity was stripped from their homes, and their credit ratings
were damaged.7 7 The scam allegedly netted approximately $6.7
million from 47 homes, mostly in California, and another $5.9
million from 68 homes across the United States.78
The preceding case examples demonstrate how mortgage
fraud was perpetrated by private mortgage brokers in the home
mortgage market during times of growth, and in times of distress
for homeowners. The case examples also illustrate the need for
criminal enforcement in this area of the home lending market,
because the intentional misrepresentations and fraud perpetrated
by these mortgage brokers had caused substantial loss to
mortgage lenders and went as far to cause people to lose their
homes.
loan applicants who are used to obtain home loans on the stray buyers
personal information and credit score to obtain a mortgage loan higher than
the actual homeowner could, but the straw buyers do not intend to occupy the
properties that they are buying).
71Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Federal Authorities Announce
Significant Regional Federal Mortgage Fraud Investigations and Prosecutions
Coinciding with Nationwide "Operation Malicious Mortgage" (June 19, 2008)
available at http:l/www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrelO8/mortgagefraudO619O8.htm
[hereinafter Press Release, Regional Federal Mortgage Fraud Investigations
and Prosecutions]; see also The Need for Increased Fraud Enforcement in the
Wake of the Economic Downturn, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4 (statement of Rita Glavin, Acting Assistant Att'y
of
Justice)
States
Dep't
Criminal
Div.,
United
Gen.,
[hereinafter
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-02-11GlavinTestimony.pdf
statement of Rita Glavin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., United
States Dep't of Justice].
71Press Release, Regional Federal Mortgage Fraud Investigations and
Prosecutions, supra note 74.
76 Id.
77 Id.

78Id.
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F. Federal Criminal Law Statutory Framework
There is no single federal "mortgage fraud" statute that
can be applied to the preceding examples of mortgage fraud.
Rather, there is a framework of federal fraud statutes that are
applicable to the schemes perpetrated in the mortgage industry.
The most commonly applied federal criminal statutes to mortgage
fraud prosecutions are: mail fraud79 , wire fraud 8 , and bank
fraud." Additionally, mortgage fraud can be prosecuted under
Section 1014, which proscribes false statements on loan
applications. 2
However, prior to the enactment of FERA, the extent to
which the provisions of this statutory frame work applied to
private mortgage brokers, if at all, was determined by whether
the fraud implicated a "financial institution" as defined by Title
18 of the United States Code. 3 Prior to the enactment of FERA,
Section 20 defined a "financial institution," as a federally insured
depository institution.84 Each of the preceding statutes will be
analyzed to show how they are applicable to mortgage fraud
prosecutions. Additionally, this brief analysis will provide the
foundation necessary to demonstrate the impact that the statutory
enhancements under FERA will have on federal mortgage fraud
prosecutions.
i.Mail, Wire, and Bank Fraud
The federal mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes were
always applicable to private mortgage brokers, but under limited
circumstances. The three statutes are similar in the nature of the
offenses that they proscribe, and in the elements of the offense
that the government must prove in order to obtain a conviction
for mortgage fraud.
All three fraud statutes, mail, wire, and bank, include a
79 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
80 Id. at § 1343.
81 Id. at § 1344.
82 Id. at § 1014.
83

18 U.S.C. § 20(1) (2006).

84 See United States v. Mavashev, No. 08-CR-902 2009 WL 4746301, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2009) (the court could not apply the amended definition of a

"financial institution" under FERA due to the constraints of the Ex Post Facto
Clause, and therefore, in a mortgage fraud prosecution, the most relevant
definition for a financial institution is a "[federally] insured depository

institution").
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fraudulent "scheme or artifice to defraud" as an element of the
offense. However, Congress has not specifically defined those
terms, and the federal courts are left to craft a definition of fraud,
an ever evolving form of criminal conduct. Courts have liberally
construed a "scheme or artifice to defraud" as "any plan, pattern
or course of action [... ] intended to deceive others to obtain
something of value.""5 Additionally, each fraud statute requires
the government to prove the defendant had a specific intent to
defraud. 86 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has
held that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail
fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes."
The elements of mail and wire fraud are almost identical,
and therefore will be analyzed together. The first element of mail
and wire fraud is participation in a "scheme or artifice to
defraud."88 Mail fraud requires the use of the mails and to
"deposit" or "cause" mail "to be deposited" to the post office or a
private interstate carrier.8" Wire fraud requires the use of
interstate wire facilities and that the accused "transmits or causes
to be transmitted [... ] any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or

sounds."90 Additionally, the use of the mail or interstate wire
communications must be in furtherance of the fraudulent
scheme.9" Mortgage companies routinely use mail and carrier
services for documents associated with mortgages, and wire
transfers are common in mortgage transactions. Therefore, the
"ISee United States v. Colon-Munoz, 192 F.3d 210, 221 (1st Cir. 1999); see
also Carolyn A. DeLone, FinancialInstitutions Fraud, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
621,640 (2009).
86 United States v. Harmon, No. 03-10537, 2004 WL 1763909, at *1 (9th
Cir. Aug. 5, 2004).
11 United States v. Neder, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999); see also United States v.
Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 489 (1997) (the United States Supreme Court understands
the term "materiality" to mean "having a natural tendency to influence or
being capable of influencing the decision making body to which the false
information was addressed).
88 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
89 18 U.S.C. § 1341; see United States v. Hitchens, No. 02-1554, 2002 WL
31898234, at *2 (3rd Cir. Nov. 19, 2002) ("It is sufficient to show that 'where
one does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the
ordinary course of business or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even
though not actually intended, then he 'causes' the mails to be used").
90 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

91 United States v. McGeehan, 584 F.3d 560, 565
92 MORTGAGE FRAUD, supra note 45, at 7;
Berry, No. 08-60011, 2009 WL 1096327, *2 (5th Cir.
the conviction for mail fraud where the defendant

(3rd Cir. 2009).
see also United States v.
Apr. 23, 2009) (sustaining
fraudulently inflated the

370

Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

[Vol. 22:3

mail and wire fraud statutes can potentially apply where fraud is
prevalent in mortgage transaction.
Prior to FERA, the federal offenses of mail fraud and wire
fraud could be applied in most instances of mortgage fraud,
including that perpetrated by private mortgage brokers. Prior to
FERA, a private mortgage broker convicted of either the mail
fraud statute or the wire fraud statute could face a fine under title
18 and a maximum of twenty years imprisonment. 3 However, the
penalties for crimes affecting a "financial institution" as defined
by Section 20 carries an increased penalty under the mail and
wire fraud statutes. If convicted for mail or wire fraud against a
"financial institution", there is a possible fine of $1,000,000 or a
thirty year prison sentence or both. 4
The mail and wire fraud statutes served as the model for
the federal bank fraud statute. The bank fraud statute prohibits
any "scheme or artifice to defraud" a financial institution or to
obtain any property from a financial institution "by false or
fraudulent pretenses." 95 However, the federal bank fraud statute
was enacted to allow protection of federally created, controlled,
or insured financial institutions. 6 The bank fraud statute requires
proof that the victim of the fraud is a federally insured
institution. A financial institution is considered a victim of bank
fraud if it is an actual or intended victim.98 Courts generally find
that banks are victims of fraud if the bank had "custody and
values of homes by modifying square footage for the purpose of obtaining
inflated loans, and caused the mail to be used and acted with knowledge the
use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business in real estate
transactions); Hitchens, 2002 WL 31898234, at *2 (to obtain a conviction for
mail fraud, it is sufficient to show that the defendant acted with knowledge
that the use of the mail would follow in the ordinary course of business, or
where such use of the mails could reasonably be foreseen).
93 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
14 Id. at §§1341, 1343.
" Id. at §1344 ("[w]hoever knowingly executes or attempts to execute a
scheme or artifice to (1) defraud a financial institution").
96 PAUL E. COGGINS, LENDER LIABILITY LAW AND LITIGATION § 11.07
(2009).

17 See United States v. Ragosta, 970 F.2d 1085, 1089 (2nd Cir. 1992) (the
defendant must engage in conduct designed to deceive a federally charted or
insured financial institution).
98United States v. Moran, 312 F.3d 480, 489 (1st Cir. 2002) (held that a
bank does not have to be the immediate victim of the defendant's fraud in
order to obtain a conviction); see also United States v. Riggs, 490 F.3d 208, 231
(2nd Cir. 2007) (the defendant must have intent to expose the financial
institution to an "actual or potential loss").
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control" of the funds in question, which in turn exposed the bank
to risk of loss or civil liability."'
To obtain a conviction under the bank fraud statute, the
government had to prove that the financial institution that was
victimized fell within the definition of "financial institution"
under Section 20, because the bank fraud statute does not define
the term "financial institution" itself. Therefore, because private
mortgage brokers and lending companies were not within the
previous definition of a "financial institution" under Section 20,
the bank fraud statute was inapplicable to private mortgage
brokers unless they victimized a specific group of financial
entities. Like violations for mail and wire fraud offenses against a
financial institution, the penalty for violating the bank fraud
statute is a fine of not more than $1,000,000, or imprisonment for
up to thirty years, or both. 10 0
While the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes were always
applicable to private mortgage brokers under the old statutory
framework, private mortgage brokers and federally insured
financial institutions were not protected or penalized to the same
effect under federal criminal law.
ii. False Statements in Mortgage Applications Statute
Unlike the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes, the federal
prohibition regarding false statements to financial institutions
under Section 1014 of Title 18 was not applicable to private
mortgage brokers prior to the passage of FERA. Section 1014
prohibits knowingly making "any false statement or report, or
willfully overvalues any land, property or security, for the
purpose of influencing" a loan or credit application "for the
purpose of influencing" a lender.)10
Prior to FERA, Section 1014 only included federal
depository institutions or government institutions among the
types of financial entities that the statute could be invoked to
protect or to prosecute for falsifying home loan applications.
" United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 908.(4th Cir. 2000).
100
18 U.S.C. §1344.
101 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2006). However, there is a circuit split on what
transactions Section 1014 applies to. The Fifth Circuit applies Section 1014
only to statements made to obtain loans or other extensions of credit. See
United States v. Devoll, 39 F.3d 575, 589-80 (5th Cir. 1994); However, other
federal circuits have applied the statute to transactions other than loans. See
United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1027-1030 (7th Cir. 1998).
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Section 1014 applied only to federal agencies, banks, and credit
associations. 01 2 Therefore, Section 1014 was inapplicable to
private mortgage brokers, even if they were handling federallyregulation or federally-insured mortgages. 13
In contrast to the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes,
materiality of falsehood is not an element of the offense under
Section 1014.104 However, the penalties under Section 1014 are
similar to the enhanced penalties under the mail, wire, and bank.
fraud statutes. Because Section 1014 applied to financial
institutions, the penalty was a fine of not more the $1,000,000 and
a maximum thirty year sentence.0 5
Section 1014 prohibits a significant offense, because it
pertains to false statements and appraisals in loan applications.
However, federal prosecutors were unable to apply Section 1014
to the conduct of private mortgages brokers despite numerous
reports of false statements on loan applications through the home
lending market.
III. The FraudEnforcement and Recovery Act of 2009
The legislative intent behind FERA's enhancements to
combat mortgage fraud is clear: to reinvigorate the federal
government's ability to investigate and prosecute the financial
frauds that "so severely undermined our financial markets and
hurt so many hard working people in these difficult economic
times".0 6 The Senate report makes a strong assertion that with
new resources and enhanced criminal statutes, "it will be easier to
ensure that all of those responsible for these financial crimes are
held accountable.' 1 7 However, the Senate acknowledged that the
"full scope of the fraud that helped trigger the economic crisis is
still unknown."'0 8 Nonetheless, the legislation specifically points
to relaxed lending standards, increased securitization of
mortgages, and the prevalence of private mortgage brokers in the
Statement of Rita Glavin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div.,
United States Dep't of Justice, supra note 74, at 10).
102

103

Id.

Wells, 519 U.S. at 498.
18 U.S.C. § 1014.
106 S. REP. No. 111-10, at 3; see also 155 CONG. REC. H5260-01 (daily ed.,
May 6, 2009) (statement of Rep. Scott) ("The Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act of 2009 is crafted to combat financial fraud that contributed to
causing and worsening our nation's current economic crisis").
101 S. REP. No. 111-10, at 2.
108 Id.
"04
.o
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real estate market as factors that "created an environment that
invited fraud."'' 9 Therefore, FERA is meant to enhance federal
law enforcement to prevent the reoccurrence of such an
environment by enhance federal statutory law and providing the
manpower to enforce it."
A. The Purpose of FERA
FERA had a two part approach to reinvigorating federal
law enforcement against mortgage fraud. First, FERA makes
enhances the criminal statutory framework that is applicable to
mortgage fraud prosecutions, to "strengthen prosecutors' ability
to combat [the] growing wave of fraud."'' The Senate Report
indicated that private mortgage brokers and lending businesses
"came to dominate the home housing market, and these
companies were not subject to the kind of banking oversight and
internal regulations that had traditionally helped prevent
'
fraud."112
Additionally, the Senate Report indicates that the
growth of securitization contributed to the increased participation
of private mortgage brokers in the home lending market.1 3 As a
result, there were "even more fraud and victimizing investors
nationwide.

'114

The Senate report highlights the significance of the
amendment to Title 18 Section 20, which allows the full force of
federal fraud laws to be extended to mortgage lending businesses
that are not directly regulated or insured by the federal
government. 1 5 The stated goal of enhancing the statutory
framework is to apply the federal fraud laws to private mortgage
businesses, "just as they apply to federally insured and regulated
116
banks."
109Id.

110

FERA also established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

("Commission") to "examine the causes, domestic and global of the current
economic crisis in the United States". Pub. L. No. 111-21 § 5. The Commission
began meeting on September 17, 2009 and will continue to examine the
financial crisis through December 15, 2010.
l S. REP. No. 111-10, at3.
Id.

(indicating that private mortgage businesses were "responsible for

nearly half of the residential mortgage market before the economic collapse").
113Id.
114

115

Id.
Id.

116 Id. at 3; see also Statement of Rita Glavin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Criminal Div., United States Dep't of Justice, supra note 73, at 10 (suggesting
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Second, FERA authorized hundreds of millions of dollars
over fiscal years 2010 and 2011 to boost the
contributed
to be
ranks of federal investigators and prosecutors. 1 7 The allocation of
these resources to federal investigative and prosecutorial agencies
will be discussed in detail in Part IV. The overall effect of this
shift in resources dedicated to combating mortgage is to provide
the ability of the federal government to more effectively
investigate and prosecute mortgage fraud as the fraud schemes
change with the residential real estate market.
B. Statutory Amendments and Enhancements under FERA
The most notable statutory amendment applicable to
mortgage fraud prosecutions is to Title 18 Section 20, which
defines "financial institution." FERA has expanded Section 20 to
include a "mortgage lending business" and mortgage brokers
within the definition of a "financial institution" for the purposes
of applying federal fraud laws."' The United States Code defines
a mortgage lending business is defined as "an organization which
finances or refinances any debt secured by an interest in real
estate, including private mortgage companies and any
subsidiaries of such organizations, and whose activities affect
interstate or foreign commerce."' 1 9 Section 20 now includes a
"mortgage lending business" or "any person or entity that makes
12
in whole or in party a federally regulated loan"' , subject to the
same federal fraud laws and penalties as federally insured and
national banks. 1 ' The Amendment to Section 20 is critical to the
application of federal fraud statutes to private mortgage brokers
in mortgage fraud cases.
Additionally, FERA enhances federal fraud laws that
were previously applicable to private mortgage brokers,
including the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes. However, the
that Mortgage brokers and lending businesses should be held accountable just
as traditional financial institutions are); see also 155 CONG. REC. S2315-01
(daily ed., Feb. 13 2009) (statement of Sen. Kaufman) ("[ . . . ]the Justice

Department's Criminal Division, the FBI, and the Special Inspector General
are deadly serious about finding and prosecuting financial fraud").
"I S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 3.
1 18 U.S.C. § 20 (2006) amended

by Pub. L. No. 111-21, §2a, 123 Stat.

1617 (2009).

11918 U.S.C. § 27 (2006).
120See' 12 U.S.C. § 2602

mortgage loan").
121

18 U.S.C.

§ 20.

(1996) (defines the term "federally related
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penalties are enhanced by FERA's amendments to existing
statutory law. FERA's amendment to Section 20 fulfills
Congress' desire to hold private mortgage brokers and businesses
accountable for fraud, given the prevalence of these actors in the
subprime mortgage market, and their impact on the federally
insured and federally regulated institutions. 122 The penalties for
crimes affecting a "financial institution" as defined by Section 20
carries an increased penalty under the mail, wire, and bank fraud
statutes. Under the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes, the
penalty increases to a maximum of $1,000,000, and a maximum
prison sentence of thirty years. 123 Furthermore, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines provide for increases in sentence range for
124
frauds that have a major effect on a financial institution.
Therefore, FERA was meant to provide harsher punishments for
mortgage fraud perpetrated among private mortgage brokers and
lending businesses.
Furthermore, expanding the definition of a "financial
institution" not only increases punishment, but provides more
fraud protection to a wider range of financial businesses in the
mortgage market. Prior to FERA, a popular defense among
mortgage fraud defendants was to claim that the government
could not prove the defendant had defrauded a "financial
institution" under Section 20 in order to obtain a conviction for
bank fraud. 125 The Section 20 amendment eliminates this legal
defense to a charge of bank fraud, because now the definition of a
"financial institution" is not simply limited to federally insured
institutions.2 6
Additionally, the FERA. enhancements now criminalize
22See S. REP. No. 111-10, at 2-3; see also 155 CONG. REC. S4531-01 (daily
ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("As long as people carrying out
these frauds and these scams think they will never get caught, will never get
prosecuted, the laws aren't tough enough, they are in an unregulated industry,
nobody is going to go after them".); 155 CONG. REC. S4531-01 (daily ed. Apr.
22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Spector) (suggesting jail sentences are important in
the way to deal with this kind of crime").
123 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341; See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343,1344.
124 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(14)(B) (requires a
four level increase in the offense level for frauds that had a major effect on a
financial institution).
125 See Mavashev, 2009 WL 4746301, at *1 (defendant asserted this defense
after allegedly had submitted loan applications containing materially false
information in order to purchase multiple properties to a wholly-owned
subsidiary of a federally insured bank).
126 See Statement of Rita Glavin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal
Div., United States Dep't of Justice, supra note 74, at 10.
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false statements to private mortgage businesses in loan
applications. FERA ensures that private mortgage brokers are
held fully accountable under Section 1014. The Senate Report
indicated that this is a "particularly important offense" to apply
to private mortgage brokers, because it "specifically relates to
false appraisal fraud, which has been a particularly problematic
type of mortgage fraud. ' 127 The FERA amendment to Section
1014 now includes the term "mortgage lending business" among
12
the financial institutions that this crime applies to.
Prior to FERA, federal prosecutors could not charge a
private mortgage lending business for making a "false statement
or report, or willfully [overvalue] any land, property, or
security.' 29 This is an 'important enhancement, given the
widespread reports of misrepresentations on home loan
applications. Private mortgage brokers can now be prosecuted to
the fullest extent of federal law. Furthermore, penalties for
violating Section 1014 are identical to that of violations of the
mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes: a fine of no more than
$1,000,000, or imprisoned not more than thirty years, or both. 30
The enhancement to Section 20 also includes one final, but
important, tool for prosecutors in combating mortgage fraud. The
statute of limitations for filing charges against defendants
affecting financial institutions is longer than that which applies to
other fraud victims. For all federal offenses "not capital", the
statute of limitations is five years.'
Mortgage fraud
investigations and prosecutions of private mortgage brokers used
to fall under this five year window in which charges must be
filed. However, for "financial institution" offenses, which private
mortgage brokers now fall under, the ten year statute of
limitations applies.'3 2
The extension of the statute of limitations will relieve a
substantial obstacle to federal authorities, because one of the
inherent complexities of mortgage fraud cases is the length of
time it takes to investigate and ultimately bring offenders to

128

S. REP. No. 111-10, at 6.
18 U.S.C. § 1014.

129

Id.

127

130 Id.

18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006) ("no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or
punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the
information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have
been committed").
132 18 U.S.C. § 3293 (2006).
131
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justice. Therefore, FERA provides the federal government twice
as much time to investigate and prosecute, signaling Congress's
seriousness about addressing and deterring mortgage fraud.
These statutory enhancements indicate Congress' seriousness
about addressing and deterring mortgage fraud in the home
lending market.
IV. FederalFraud Enforcement after FERA
The statutory enhancements that FERA provides to
federal criminal law were necessary in order to level the playing
field, and allow federal criminal statutes to be applicable to all
home mortgage lenders.13 3 A loan from a large national bank on
Wall Street can have just as much impact on a consumer's life as
a loan originated by a private broker on Main Street. A fraud
perpetrated by a private mortgage broker should be subject to the
full extent of the federal fraud laws just as federally insured
lending institutions were prior to the enactment of FERA.
However, enhancing federal criminal law in response to
the recent credit crisis is a potential source of criticism for FERA.
In light of the pressures from the public, and their constituencies,
a main motivation for Congress to pass FERA was to restore
faith in the federal government's ability to combat criminal
activity in the residential real estate market. The public's "zeal
1 34
for Wall Street pelts is high.
During Senate floor debates, it was noted that constituents
"feel no one is paying a price for [the financial crisis] - except

hard-working

people out around America. "135 Additionally,

Senator's constituents have even questioned, "who is going to be
held accountable?"' 36 The primary sponsor of FERA, Senator
Patrick Leahy stated in reference to the perpetrators of mortgage
fraud: "I want to not only get the people who did it, but I want to
deter others from doing it in the future."13' 7 Therefore, the desire
These statutory amendments remove potential defenses from mortgage
fraud prosecutions, such as claiming that the victim that was defrauded was
not a financial institution as previously defined by 18 U.S.C. § 20. See
Mavashev, 2009 WL 4746301, at *1.
134 David Segal, Financial Fraud Rises as Target For Prosecutors, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at Al.
131 155 CONG. REC. S4531-01 23 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Kaufman).
136 155 CONG. REC. S4531-01 21 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of
Sen.
Spector).
13' 155 CONG. REC. S4531-01 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen.
133
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amongst the public and members of Congress for accountability
and deterrence for the recent collapse is reflected in Congress'
concerns while debating the passage of FERA. 13 8
Commentators have noted that legislators often turn to the
criminal law in order to respond to crisis in the economy, and to
political pressure to formulate a response. 39 It should not be
concluded too quickly that the provisions of FERA enhancing
federal criminal law were passed simply as a political response to
the concerns of the public and investors. Nonetheless, FERA is
subject to criticisms, particularly whether the tough talk of
Congress has any real legal teeth.
There are three main criticisms that can be directed at
FERA. First, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution will limit the application of the enhanced statutory
framework to private mortgage brokers who may have
committed fraud during the peak of the housing boom. As a
result, only the future deterrent goals of Congress can be carried
out. Second, the subprime lending industry has come to a virtual
standstill. The source of several opportunities for mortgage fraud
may no longer exist in the home lending market. Therefore, the
enhanced criminalization of mortgage broker coming at such a
late stage in the mortgage crisis may not fulfill the desired effect
of FERA. And third, FERA amends already applicable statutes,
and the federal government was effective in enforcing those laws
before, therefore the actual deterrent effect of further
criminalizing mortgage broker conduct for the purpose of
protecting lenders and consumers is called into question.
Despite these criticisms, the overall effect of the statutory
enhancements and resources that FERA providesto federal law
enforcement will be to more effectively police the home mortgage
market. As a result of the federal government's commitment to
Leahy).
138 See 155 CONG. REC. S4531-01 25 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of
Sen. Kaufman) (Senator Kaufman noted during floor debates on the passage of
FERA, that revamping federal law enforcement in the residential mortgage
industry is not a "witch hunt", but that "we need the FBI agents and the
prosecutors to make sure we get the right people and that they are prosecuted
to the full extent of the law").
"I See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance Among Corporate Criminal
Liability, Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1459, 1464 (2009); Abbe David Lowell & Kathryn C. Arnold, Corporate
Crime after 2000: A New Law Enforcement Challenge or D6jd vu?, 40 AM.
CRiM. L. REV. 219, 221 (2003) (discussing Congress' response to the corporate
frauds of the early 2000's).
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preventing fraud, mortgage lending, investment in the lending
market, and the ability of consumers to obtain housing, will be
more secure.
A. Ex Post Facto Clause Limitations
The full effect of the statutory enhancements under FERA
cannot be applied to mortgage brokers who committed fraud
during the housing boom because of the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the United States Constitution. 40 The Ex Post Facto Clause
prohibits imposition of statutes that criminalize or increase
penalties for criminal conduct that preceded the legislature's
enactment of the statute. 4 ' Applying a statutory revision which
increases the punishment of a crime, after the offense was
committed is a violation of the ex post facto clause. 142 The
statutory enhancements that FERA provides are inapplicable to
mortgage fraud committed before enacting FERA into law.
Therefore, private mortgage brokers who have committed mail,
wire, or bank fraud that has affected a "financial institution" will
not be subject to the increased fines or penalties that FERA
provides.
Additionally, the extension of the ten year statute of
limitations for financial institutions crimes, which FERA now
applies to mortgage brokers, may not apply to frauds which were
committed prior to the enactment of FERA. It is well established
that extending the statute of limitations for prosecuting crimes
which have not yet expired is not a violation of the ex post facto
clause. 43 All United States Federal Circuit Courts have addressed
this issue, and have uniformly held the extending a limitations
period before the prosecution is barred does not violate the ex
144
post facto clause.
140

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 3 ("No bill of attainder or ex post facto law

shall be passed").
141 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (the ex post facto clause
protects the accused's liberty by preventing the government from enacting
criminal statutes with "manifestly unjust and oppressive" retro active effects
on the accused).
142 See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432-33 (1987).
143 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 617 (2003).
144 United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1351 (11th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Brechtel, 997 F.2d 1108, 1113 (5th Cir.1993); Cf. Stogner, 539 U.S. at
617-21 (explaining that a statute may not be passed which revives an already
expired statute of limitations, because it is the kind of the retroactive harm
that violates the ex post facto clause).
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However, the only basis for applying the ten year statute
of limitations to private mortgage brokers before the five years
has run is the amended definition of "financial institution" which
did not previously include mortgage lending businesses and
mortgage brokers. Therefore, FERA will not allow the federal
government to prosecute mortgage brokers who may have
committed fraud that contributed to the mortgage crisis.
Nonetheless, the statutory enhancements under FERA extend the
length of federal investigations, and provide federal prosecutors
the ability to charge mortgage fraud defendant's with a greater
variety of offenses than before.
B. Enhancing Criminal Enforcement of Mortgage Brokers
The passage of FERA was far from over "criminalizing"
145
the federal fraud statutes applicable in mortgage fraud cases.
The statutory enhancements that FERA applies to the federal
criminal law statutory framework are meant to level the playing
field among actors in the residential mortgage industry. FERA
was required in order to update federal criminal fraud statutes to
reflect the realities of the home mortgage lending market. The
market had undergone significant change in recent years, most
notably the emergence of private mortgage brokers in the system
of mortgage originations. 146
One of Congress' driving concerns for passing FERA was
the increased reporting of mortgage fraud. 4 The reports of
mortgage fraud in the residential real estate market also justify
the targeting of private mortgage brokers in mortgage fraud
investigations. However, the amount of mortgage fraud in the
market, or its perpetrators, cannot precisely be determined. There
is no central information collecting point for mortgage fraud. The
closest thing to providing mortgage fraud reporting to federal law
enforcement in the residential real estate market is utilizing
Suspicious Activity Reports ("SARs"). Federally insured banking
institutions and their affiliates are required to report suspected
criminal financial activity by filing SARs.148 A federally regulated
145

Cf. Moohr, supra note 139, at 1464 (noting that the provisions of FERA

prohibit conduct that was already covered by other statutes).
146 UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR, supra note 22, at 8.
W'Enforcement of FinancialConsumer ProtectionLaws, supra note 11, at
2.
48 DeLone, supra note 85, at 638 (the Department of the Treasury, the
Office of Thrift Supervision, the Office of the Currency, the Federal Reserve,
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institution subject to the SAR reporting requirement is required
to submit a report to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
("FinCEN"), which then may detect "a known or suspected
violation of federal law", and distribute the SARs to federal law
enforcement agencies.14 9
The SARs filed by federally insured depository institutions
pertaining to mortgage fraud increased by 1,411% between 1997
and 2005.15° In 2003, SARs reporting of mortgage loan fraud
51
increased by 77% over 2002, and continued to increase.
Overall, SARs alleging mortgage fraud have increased nearly
tenfold, and SAR mortgage fraud filings from financial
institutions has increased 36 percent to total 63, 713 reports
during 2008.152
The increase in reporting is partially attributable to the
increased investigation on behalf of the mortgage industry. 5 3 The
growing awareness of mortgage fraud is confirmed by the year to
year increase in the number of SARs reported. 5 4 Furthermore,
from 1997 to 2005, commercial banks and thrifts acquired almost
150 independent mortgage lending businesses, therefore making
5
those institutions subject to mandatory submissions of SARs. 1
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation created the Suspicious Activity
Report to assist with the detection of illegal activities in the financial industry).
149 12 C.F.R. § 208.62 (2008); The SAR reporting requirement applies to (1)
federal banks under OCC supervision, 12 C.F.R. §21.11 (2008); (2) FDICinsured state banks, 12 C.F.R. § 208.62 (2008); (3) banks generally, 12 C.F.R. §
353.3 (2008); and (4) FDIC-insured savings associations, 12 C.F.R. § 563.180
(2008).
150 See Remarks of James H. Freis, supra note 37; see also FINCEN
SusPicious ACTIVITY REPORT ANALYSIS, supra note 23, at 1. The figures
represented in the SAR analysis conducted by FinCEN do not provide the
complete picture of the potential fraud that existed in the mortgage industry.
SAR reporting does not include the private lending industry, because they are
not subject to the federal reporting requirements.
151 FIN.
CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FILING TRENDS
IN
MORTGAGE LOAN FRAUD: A REVIEW OF SusPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS
FILED JULY 1, 2007 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2008 5 (2008), available at

http://www.fincen.gov/newsroom/nr/pdf/20090225a.pdf. (last visited Feb. 20,
2010) [hereinafter FILING TRENDS IN MORTGAGE LOAN FRAUD].
152 See FBI 2008 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT, supra note 29; see also S.
REP. NO. 111-10, at 2.
151 See Jennifer Butts et al., supra note 56, 8.
14 FINCEN SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT ANALYSIS, supra note 23, at 4.
However, companies often report fraud cases years after the loans are
originated, and therefore some of the SARs reported in 2004 and 2005 may
have dealt with loans originated from 2000-2003.
155 Merle Sharick et al., Eight Periodic Mortgage Fraud Case Report to
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While, the drastic increase in reporting can also be attributed to
the increase in 'activity in the mortgage industry, that same
increase in mortgage loan origination activity provided an
increase in the opportunities for mortgage fraud to occur within
the residential real estate market.
FinCEN conducted a study of the SAR's filed by
depository institutions between 1996 and 2006 that contained
suspicious reports of mortgage fraud. 15 6 Of the 82, 851 SARs that
reported suspected mortgage fraud during that time span,
FinCEN chose a random sample of 1,054 'SAR's to study.'57
Within that sample the number of reports of private mortgage
brokers suspected of fraud in the first quarter of 2006 was equal
to the total number of reports filed in 2004.158 In addition to
mortgage brokers originating as many as half to two-thirds of
mortgage loans by 2006, FinCEN statistical reports indicate that
the suspected fraud among private mortgage brokers had also
experienced a significant increase during this period.15 9
Additionally, the FinCEN study showed that reports of
material misrepresentations and false statements were the most
reported suspicious activity in conjunction with mortgage
fraud.1 60 While FinCEN statistical reports may be the most
comprehensive analysis of mortgage fraud in the lending market,
there are additional studies being conducted by the lending
industry that.support FinCEN's conclusions. The Mortgage
Asset Research Institute ("MARI") utilizes the Mortgage Bankers
Association endorsed Mortgage Industry Data Exchange
("MIDEX") subscriber database which contains information6 1
submitted by over 400 mortgage lenders, agencies, and insurers.
Mortgage Bankers Association, 8 MORTGAGE ASSET RESEARCH INST. 2
(2006), available at http://www.marisolutions.com/pdfs/mbaMBA8thCase
Rpt.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
156 FINCEN SusPIcIous ACTIVITY REPORT ANALYSIS, supra note 23, at
1.
157Id.

15' Id. at 6.
159

Id.

160

Id.

at 8. (of the 1,054 sample SARs, 65.78% revealed reports of material

misrepresentation and false statements on loan applications, including: altered
bank statements, altered or fraudulent earnings documentation, fraudulent
letters of credit, fabricated letters of gift, misrepresentation of employment,
altered credit scores, invalid social security numbers, failure to disclose
borrower debts or assets, and mortgage brokers using the identities of prior
customers to obtain loans).
161 See Jennifer Butts et al., supra note 56, at 7 (The fraud experiences of
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Like the FinCEN analysis, MARI reports that misrepresentation
on loan applications ranks highest among fraud types for 2007,
2006, 2005, and 2004.162
While the legislative history behind FERA reveals
Congress in effect assuming that the sharp increase in SAR
reporting is indicative of the prevalence of fraud committed by
private mortgage brokers, the statistics that are reported do
support and justify the passage of FERA and the expansion of
federal fraud statutes to apply to in more instances of mortgage
fraud perpetrated by private mortgage brokers. The amount
SARs suspecting mortgage broker fraud supports Congress'
concern of these actors in the mortgage market. Additionally, the
fact that false statements and misrepresentations ranks the
highest amongst the types of fraud among SARs and the MIDEX
index supports the expanded applicability of Section 1014, the
statute that prohibits false statements and appraisals in loan
1 63
applications.
Under FERA, Section 1014 applies to both federally
insured depository institutions and to private mortgage brokers.
This is a significant statutory amendment, because private
mortgage brokers had captured at least half of the mortgage
market at the peak of the hosing boom. Additionally, the
statutory enhancements to the mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes
increase the ability to charge mortgage fraud defendants in a
wider variety of mortgage fraud cases.
However,
there has
been a "virtual halt" in
nonconforming, subprime lending. 164 The subprime mortgage
market is dormant, and non-conforming lending activity is
modest at best. 165 Additionally, hundreds of lenders whose
businesses were dependent on the secondary mortgage market
through mortgage backed securities, and ideal contenders for
fraud for profit schemes, have closed their doors and declared
bankruptcy since 2007.166 These developments raise questions as
to whether the statutory enhancements under FERA will provide
independent mortgage businesses are represented, among others in the
MIDEX database).
162 Id. at 5 (noting that the prevalence of misrepresentations and false
statements on loan applications is "hardly surprising, given that the
application form is comprehensive in collecting borrower personal identity,
employment, asset and liability information").
163 See 18 U.S.C. § 1014.
164

See Jennifer Butts et al., supra note 56, at 2.
Merle Sharick et al., supra note 10, at 8.
Id.

161 See
166
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meaningful criminal enforcement if the residential lending
industry if the intended targets-of the legislation may no longer be
in business.
C. Effective Deterrence under FERA
While the federal government cannot hold fraudsters who
contributed to the mortgage crisis accountable under FERA, the
enhancements to the federal criminal law statutory framework
and increased funding to federal law enforcement will allow
federal authorities to disrupt and prosecute current and future
frauds in the home lending market. However, like the underlying
policy of accountability, the desired deterrent effect of FERA is
susceptible to criticism. Policy makers exhibited a desire to deter
future frauds in the residential real estate market by passing
FERA. However, like talk of accountability and stiff criminal
penalties, politicians often use the language of deterrence to
justify increases in criminal penalties.'6 7
Criminal penalties are the least used method of consumer
protection today. 6 8 While criminal law is not often implemented,
it can be an affective means of enhancing consumer protection.'6 9
The goal of such consumer protection legislation is to prosecute,
punish, deter, and to prevent intentional, deviant, and
normatively
unacceptable
conduct.7 0
Unlike
individual
consumers, the state has a special independent interest in
ensuring that criminal conduct is met with negative sanctions.'
However, the decision to rely on criminal law enforcement in the
area of consumer protection requires that a cost benefit analysis
be conducted.'72 If criminal sanction is not a sufficient deterrent,
Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94
VA. L. REV. 1295, 1330 (2008).
167

168

DEE PRIDGEN, RICHARD M.

ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION

AND THE LAW §7.22 (2009); Christopher Steelman, Mortgages and
Misdemeanors: Criminal Enforcement of State Mortgage Lending License
Requirements and Homeowner Protection,45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1454
(2008) (a survey of state criminal laws enforced against mortgage lending
revealed that "criminal sanction is often the least utilized method of
enforcement").
169 Peter Cartwright, Product Safety and Consumer Protection,58 MOD. L.
REV. 222, 231 (1995).
170 Eric H. Steele, Fraud, Dispute, and the Consumer: Responding to
Consumer Complaints, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1107, 1108 (1975).
171 Id. at 1110.
172 Steelman, supra note 168, at 1450-5 1.
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then the costs of implementing it may outweigh the additional
consumer protection that it provides.'7 3
Some provisions of FERA do in fact prohibit conduct that
has already been criminalized by federal law, such as the mail,
wire, and bank fraud statutes. Furthermore, FERA amends laws
that were previously applicable to private mortgage brokers, the
actors that Congress was most concerned with in passing FERA.
Additionally, the federal government was able to engage in
successful investigations and prosecutions before FERA was
enacted." 4 Through 2007, 1,204 mortgage fraud cases resulted in
321 indictments, and 260 convictions of mortgage fraud
defendants." 5 The ability of the federal government to investigate
and prosecute mortgage fraud without expanded charging
abilities and enhanced penalties might suggest that FERA was an
unnecessary piece of legislation, therefore supporting the criticism
that FERA was a political response to the mortgage crisis.
However, the federal investigations and prosecutorial
efforts to date only reflect a tiny percentage of reported mortgage
fraud within the residential lending industry. There have been
relatively few major federal mortgage fraud prosecutions to
date. 6 But the lack of federal prosecutions is not an indicator
See Id. at 1450 ("the social benefits associated with prohibiting certain
undesirable conduct of residential mortgage lenders [ . . . ] would likely be
outweighed by the costs associated with the use of criminal sanction if the
threat of the criminal sanction were not sufficient to deter the conduct").
114 The federal government engages in a collaborative enforcement
approach among enforcement agencies when addressing mortgage fraud.
However, the FBI is the main investigative enforcement agency addressing
mortgage fraud. Enforcement efforts often take the form of "enforcement
sweeps" or "task forces", the most recent being "Operation Malicious
Mortgage". See Press Release, Regional Federal Mortgage Fraud
Investigations and Prosecutions, supra note 74; see also John D. Arterberry,
Mortgage and Securitization Fraud: The Department of Justice Enforcement
Program, 1688 PRAC. L. INST. 405, 407 (2008) (Operation "Malicious
Mortgage" involved the Department of Justice, the FBI, the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service, the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation
Division, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Secret
Service. The DOJ also focuses on fraud that may have impacted mortgage
securitization, and works closely with the Securities and Exchange
Commission to identify and prosecute fraud associate with securitization).
173

175 FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC FISCAL YEAR 2007, supra

note 26.
176 Andrew J. Ceresney, Gordon Eng & Sean R. Nuttall, Regulatory
Investigations and the Credit Crisis: The Searchfor Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 225, 235 (2009); see also Eric Lichtblau, David Johnston, & Ron Nixon,
F.B.I. Struggling to Handle Wave of Finance Cases, N.Y. TIMES., Oct. 19,
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that mortgage fraud may not be as prevalent as reported. Rather,
the relatively low number of major federal prosecutions is
indicative that federal law enforcement did not have the
resources available to effectively address this continuing problem
in the residential real estate market.
The lack of law enforcement against mortgage fraud can
be in-part contributed to the shift in federal resources to
counterterrorism efforts after 9-11. The FBI shifted more than
1,800 agents to terrorism and intelligence duties, which resulted
in a severe loss in staffing for investigations into white-collar
crimes such as mortgage fraud."' Prior to the enactment of
FERA, the FBI's resources were reportedly so depleted that they
were unable to address suspected mortgage fraud cases that
involved possible frauds of millions of dollars in losses to
1 8
financial institutions.
Despite the relatively few successes of the FBI and DOJ in
investigating and prosecuting mortgage fraud prior to the
enactment of FERA, the costs of mortgage fraud continued to
increase and federal resources remained overwhelmed. In 2006
alone, after the mortgage lending boom had subsided, the FBI
reported that mortgage fraud cost the mortgage lending industry
between $946 million and $4.2 billion." 9 In 2008 it was estimated
that the dollar losses due to mortgage fraud could reach $2.5
billion, and that comparable losses were expected in following
years.18 ° Now the annual losses from mortgage fraud are
estimated to be in the range of $4 billion and $6 billion.'
Additionally, the FBI's mortgage fraud caseload has
tripled in the past three years.8 2 The FBI reported in 2008 that
2008, at Al (Federal prosecutions for frauds perpetrated against financial
institutions dropped 48 percent from 2000 to 2007).
177Lichtblau, Johnston, & Nixon, supra note 177.
'7 Id.; see also Statement of John Pistole, Deputy Dir. Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, supra note 33, at 4 ("the increasing mortgage, corporate fraud,
and financial institution failure case inventory, is straining the FBI's limited
White Collar Crime resources").
179 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Mortgage Fraud: New Partnership to
Combat Problem, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/marchO7/mortgageO3O9O7.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
18 National Mortgage News, Daily Briefing, Weekend Edition: News
Recap, Mortgage losses Forecast at $2.5 Billion, Mar 2008, available at
http://www.mortgage-technology.com/premium/archive/?ts= 1206633604 (last
visited Feb. 20, 2010).
181 Fed. Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi
gov/hq/mortgage_fraud.htm (last visited Feb. 20 2010).
182 Kenneth R. Harney, Halfa Billion Dollars Says U.S. Is Getting Serious

2010]

Home Mortgage Lending Market

the 63 percent of all open fraud investigations, totaling 1,035
cases, involved dollar losses totaling more than $1 million." 3 As of
November 2009, the FBI was working on more than 2,800
mortgage fraud investigations, 1,842 of which involved over $1
million in losses.18 4 The exploding case load in FBI investigations
indicates the presence of fraud throughout the home lending
market. Additionally, this increase in investigations demonstrates
the need for increased federal resources for the investigation and
prosecution of mortgage fraud cases.
Resources and manpower are an issue in mortgage fraud
prosecutions due to the inherent complexities of the mortgage
industry and the schemes that fraudsters perpetrate. These
inherent complexities of mortgage fraud cases are acerbated by
strained federal law enforcement resource and manpower
shortages.'85 Obstacles to prosecution include the time and
resources necessary to investigate and uncover wrongdoing, as
well as the difficulty in apportioning blame, and proving intent to
defraud.'8 6
While enhancing the federal criminal law statutory
framework, FERA also reinvigorates federal law enforcement of
mortgage fraud by authorizing hundreds of millions of dollars to
federal investigators and prosecutors. FERA provides $140
million dollars to the FBI to nearly double the size of its mortgage
and financial fraud program.18 7 Additionally, FERA provides
$470 million to the DOJ for hiring new personnel, and provides
additional funds to other federal agencies that investigate
mortgage fraud. 88 The shift in focus to investigating and
About Busting Fraud, WASH. POST, May 30, 2009, at Fin. E01 (the exploding
case load in investigations of the FBI is indicative of the increase in the
mortgage fraud through out the home lending market).
183

FBI 2008

MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT,

supra note 29.

"I Testimony to the FinancialCrisisInquiry Commission, 2 (Jan. 14, 2010)
(statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., United
States Dep't. of Justice) http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/
pdfs/2010-0114-Breuer.pdf.
181 Ceresney et al., supra note 176, at 235.
186

Id.

I'l S. REP. No. 111-10, at 3.
188 Id. (FERA also authorizes $50 million a year for U.S. Attorney's Offices
to staff fraud task forces in the hardest hit parts of the nation, $40 million for
the Criminal, Civil, and Tax Divisions at the Justice Department, and $160
million for investigators and analysts at the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the
U.S. Secret Service, and the Office of the Inspector General for the
Department of Housing and Urban Development to combat fraud in Federal
housing assistance programs).
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prosecuting mortgage fraud is vital to combat the growing wave
of fraud that Congress considered in enacting FERA. 189
In addition to criminal prosecutions, Congress' investment
in enforcement is predicted to not only root out fraudulent
activity in the home lending market, but also lead to increased
restitution payments to victims of mortgage fraud. 9 ° Federal
statutory law provides for restitution recovery for fraud
convictions."' It is estimated that the government recovers more
than $20 for every dollar spent on criminal fraud litigation. 9 2 The
dollar losses caused by mortgage fraud in the residential lending
market are substantial, and FERA is a necessary response to this
continuing criminal activity. 193
Furthermore, reinvigorated criminal enforcement under
FERA is an effort to restore the public's faith in the federal
government's ability to police the home lending market. Under
FERA federal investigators and prosecutors will be combating a
crime which eroded confidence in the home lending market and
its institutions which were relied upon by investors, and
depended upon by consumers to meet their housing needs. While
FERA will not have the effect of holding those who may have
contributed to the mortgage crisis accountable, this new
legislation will ensure that federal law enforcement possesses the
tools necessary to respond to future frauds against lenders and
consumers.
Mortgage fraud schemes evolve with the changing
economic conditions in the home lending market. This
phenomenon is demonstrated by the increase in foreclosure rescue
155 CONG. REC. S 4531-01 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Kaufman) ("[FERA] helps ensure that sophisticated criminals cannot cover
their tracks and escape liability. Unless we get some agents working on these
cases soon, the trails may go cold").
190155 CONG. REC. S4774-02 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
19118 U.S.C. § 366A (2006) (a court is mandated to require a defendant to
pay restitution to a victim when the defendant is convicted of an offense "in
which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered [... ] pecuniary loss"); see
United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 292-94 (1st Cir. 2008) (the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act compels a sentencing court to order a defendant to pay
restitution to victims).
192 155 CONG. REC. S4774-02 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2009) (Statement of Sen.
Leahy).
' Statement of John Pistole, Deputy Dir. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
supra note 33 ("Mortgage and related corporate fraud were not the sole sources
of the current financial crisis; however, it would be irresponsible to neglect
mortgage fraud's impact on the U.S. housing and financial markets").
189
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scams as consumer debt and risk of foreclosure increases in the
currently depressed housing market. Foreclosure rescue schemes
have increased substantially, with more than 2.3 million
properties foreclosed upon in 2008.114 The ability of the federal
government to respond to these- developments in the lending
market is critical to not only enforcing the law and protecting
consumers, but also restoring confidence in the market as a
whole.
FERA broadens the range of conduct that is subject to
criminal prosecufion, results in less constrained prosecutions with
a ten year statute of limitations, and increases penalties for more
actors in the home lending market. Increasing criminal sentences
for mortgage fraud has the effect of putting the industry
professional intending to profit from fraud
on fair notice that
91 5
such conduct will not longer be tolerated.
However, it is a difficult question to address whether such
sanctions do actually prevent mortgage fraud in the home
mortgage lending market. The government and the industry are
uncertain of the prevalence of fraud in lending practices, because
there is no central reporting system for mortgage fraud.
Therefore, it is not possible to measure the deterrent effect of
criminal sanctions against trends in reported mortgage fraud.
Nonetheless, the costs of implementing FERA in the
residential real estate market are well outweighed by the
reassurances that enhanced law enforcement could provide to
investors, lenders, and consumers. The potential deterrent effect
that a broader federal criminal statutory framework and the
manpower necessary to aggressively enforce those laws, is
sufficient to respond to the spike in reported mortgage fraud, and
to future threats in the home lending market.
V. Conclusion
FERA now provides the federal government, mortgage
lenders, and consumers, what was needed five years ago at the
FBI 2008 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT, supra note 29; See also Jennifer
Butts et al., supra note 56, at 8 (identifying foreclosure prevention schemes as
an emerging scenario the mortgage lending industry should be concerned
about); FINCEN SusPicious ACTIVITY REPORT ANALYSIS, supra note 23, at
18 (the current trend of rising interest rates and slowing housing equity growth
could result in debt elimination fraud).
195See Donald P. Rothschild & Bruce C. Throne, Criminal Consumer
Fraud:A Victim-Oriented Analysis, 74 MICH. L. REV. 661, 691 (1975).
114
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peak of the subprime mortgage boom. The enhanced enforcement
capabilities of the federal government will now be more effective
at disrupting fraudulent lending practices, and prosecuting
offenders. Criminal prosecutions alone are not the answer to
eliminating fraud in the home mortgage lending market.
However, no solution is possible without the aggressive
enforcement of federal criminal laws against mortgage fraud.
Such an effort on behalf of policy makers and federal law
enforcement authorities will protect both home mortgage lenders
and consumers seeking to refinance their existing mortgages, or to
fulfill the American dream of homeownership.

